We examine the three interlinked Irish crises : the competitiveness, fiscal and banking crises, showing how all three combined to lay a lethal trap for Ireland. Starting from a point of economic balance, a series of poor government decisions led to the country once dubbed the "Celtic tiger" become the second eurozone state after Greece to seek a bailout, with the EFSF/IMF intervening in late 2010.
1.

The triple crisis
Over the last three years, the Irish economy has suffered a confluence of three simultaneous and inter-related crises, all unprecedented in the peace time history of the developed economies in their magnitude and coincident nature. The government responsible for presiding over these three crisis was voted out of office on 25 February 2011, losing 6 in 7 of its seats, with neither the prime minister nor deputy prime minister returning to the parliament, and with few cabinet ministers (ironically the finance minister was one) retaining a seat. Starting from the summer of 2007, the Irish banking crisis grew from a mild case of liquidity shortages to a run on banks shares in early 2008 and to a full blown collapse of the sector in the second half of 2008. Subsequent government responses to the crisis led, by mid-2010, to contagion from the insolvent banking sector to sovereign balance sheet.
In early 2008 the Irish economy was the first in the Eurozone to enter a recession. As a small open economy, Ireland was always susceptible to the exogenous shocks and the global downturn acted to exacerbate the overall recessionary momentum. However, much of the economic collapse was predicated on purely internal economic imbalances that developed over the period of [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] and that relate to the decline in international competitiveness, poor regulatory and supervisory environments in banking, construction and other sectors, over-reliance for growth on construction sector and lack of proper functional macroeconomic and fiscal stabilization systems. Although growth returned to both GDP and GNP measures in the last quarter of 2010, courtesy of the severe fiscal austerity measures required to bring public deficits from their stratospheric highs of 32% of GDP in 2010 to 3-4% of GDP by 2015, it is highly unlikely that the Irish economy will be able to escape a double dip recession on real growth side.
Taking out of the equation cyclical and banks-related components of the Irish structural fiscal deficit stood at over 10% of GDP in 2010 and per latest Government and independent forecasts, this trend is likely to persist through 2011 despite significant austerity measures enacted in the Budget 2011. This crisis was predicated on two independent sources -a significant decline in tax revenues from transaction taxes since 2008 and unsustainable increases in public expenditure over the period of [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . This paper outlines the triple crisis in Ireland. The extent of the crisis can be seen by comparing the evolution of national income over time as in Figure 1 .
2.
The "Celtic tiger" era: seeds of its own destruction Economic conditions in Ireland during the 1980s were catastrophic, characterised by high unemployment, high rates of emigration, high rates of inflation, and high levels of personal taxes.
Economic growth was sluggish in the first half of the decade, and by 1985 the debt/GDP ratio was over 120%, and the twin budget and current account deficits were almost 14%. Despite cutting back on the public capital spending programme in the late 1980s, growth in national debt outpaced growth in GNP as the cost of servicing the debt spiralled. After sequential political uncertainty in the late 1980s, a government finally implemented a programme of fiscal restraint in 1987. Combined with large cuts in capital spending, rapid export growth, devaluation of the Irish punt in 1986 and a large increase in emigration (resulting in lower fiscal costs of unemployment), by the early 1990s there was a vast improvement in the Irish fiscal accounts. Whilst a number of authors have attributed the dramatic decline in Irish debt as a classical case of 'expansionary fiscal contraction', attributable to large cuts in public consumption and investment expenditure, Bradley and Whelan (1997) contend that Ireland's positive growth experience at that stage can be largely explained by external factors.
Prior to 2001, Irish economic growth can be described as being fuelled by a combination of the economic catching up process and the effects of the global spillovers from the ICT bubble. The former force implies that between 1991 and 1998-1999, Ireland, previously one of the least developed European economies, was rapidly converging in macroeconomic terms to the Euro area average levels of income and markets development (Honohan and Walsh (2002) ). By the end of 1999 Ireland had surpassed the Euro zone averages in virtually all parameters of economic development. Rapid economic growth in this period was underpinned by robust productivity growth rates (Whelan (2010)) increasing FDI, improving demographics reflected in rapid growth in the younger segment of the workforce and rising participation rates (Honohan and Walsh (2002) ). A reversal of net outward emigration toward strong inflow of returning emigrants and new immigrants completed the process that helped keep wage inflation relatively in check over the period of 1989-1999. At the same time, driven by FDI and, at later stages also by domestic ICT sector expansion, productivity grew by close to or above 3% per annum during the 1990s.
Convergence was substantially completed by around 1999, when the national economy entered a brief, but robust boom in ICT sector supported however by artificially inflated valuations. By 2001, the Irish economy has developed a far less publicized, but nonetheless significant ICT bubble that primarily impacted some of the foreign multinationals operating in the country as well as less stable, but significant in the size of their capitalization, domestic start ups (see Khamsi (2005) , Honohan and Leddin (2006) Persistently low real interest rates (based on a combination of rampant domestic inflation and low policy rates set by the ECB) and easy access to credit "contributed to inflating private sector balance sheets and property prices. Both household and non-financial corporate indebtedness rose sharply prior to the crisis to levels that were among the highest in the EU27" (Commission (2011) ).
By 2007, average house prices were almost 2.7x 2000 levels, while investment in buildings rose from around 5% of GDP in 1995 to a peak of over 14% in 2008. As Figure 6 shows, the same period saw a dramatic loss of external competitiveness in the economy. The Irish economy therefore was, even absent any major external shock, in a weakened position by early 2008.
The Irish Fiscal Crisis
The (2011)). The government also cut income tax rates repeatedly, with the result that income taxes as a percentage of total tax revenue declined from 37% in 1994 to 27% in 2006 (Lane (2008) ). Additionally, the tax base was narrowed as exemption levels were raised, placing those on low incomes, comprising almost 50 percent of PAYE workers, outside the tax net. Consequently, the income tax burden was exceptionally light - Whelan (2009): p.8) estimates that the average tax rate for a single income married couple with two children on the average wage was 6.7%, compared with an EU-15 average of 23.7% and an OECD average of 21.1%.
Whilst income tax cuts were popular, the transformation in composition of tax revenues over this period was highly significant. This facility was advanced subject to the implementation of an austere fiscal consolidation programme, which is subject to quarterly review. This facility was severely criticised (see for instance Kösters, De Grauwe et al. (2010) Davis (2010), Barley (2010) , de Grauwe (2011)) should also site our own work -e.g. IT articles co-signed etc. for the widely perceived onerous interest rate, close to 6%, which the European component attracted. This interest rate, combined with the pre-existing high levels of debt, would result in very significant diversion of tax revenue to the bailout.
Principal among the conditions imposed on advancing the loan facility is the requirement to correct the fiscal imbalance by €15 billion or 9% of GDP over the period. This adjustment is divided between expenditure reduction and tax increases in the ratio 2:1 in an attempt to reduce the budget deficit to less than 3% of GDP by 2015. Whilst the Irish government are committed to these targets, doubts remain about Ireland's ability to achieve them, not least because of increased debt servicing costs and uncertainty about growth rates (IMF (2010)).
The challenge in addressing the structural imbalance in the Irish economy cannot be understated. The primary policy error of the past ten years -employing windfall receipts from transitory property taxes to fund the rapid growth of permanent spending commitments and the narrowing of the tax base -must be reversed. This entails significantly expanding the tax base by including a greater proportion of employees, a process that was initiated in the 2011 budget.
Furthermore, revenue from new sources of taxation is required, including carbon tax, water tax and property tax. The latter should be sustainable, however, determined on stock of housing rather than transactions in the housing sector or activity in the domestic construction sector. Whilst the implementation of pro-cyclical fiscal policies were a primary factor in creating the structural imbalance in the Irish economy, ironically pro-cyclical policies are also required to address the deficit.
The size of the challenge facing the Irish government is immense -the average primary balance required to stabilise the public debt/GDP ratio at the 2007 level is 5.4% annually for 10 years (BIS (2010b)). Whilst it may be argued that the level of Irish public debt/GDP in 2007 was extremely low, the required transformation in the budget balance is daunting when one considers the projected budget deficit of minus 12% for 2011. The required fiscal correction is exacerbated by the extremely high level of post-crisis absolute debt, which will be difficult to reduce because the permanent loss of potential output means that government revenue may have to be permanently lowered (BIS (2010b)).
As general government debt is projected to continue rising until 2013, and forecasted to peak at over 120% in 2013, debt servicing costs will double from 3% of GDP in 2010 to over 6% of GDP from 2014 (Commission (2011) ). A number of commentators have expressed doubts about Ireland's ability to service this level of debt, especially because of projected sluggish growth rates which will be further hindered by contractionary budgets (see for example McCarthy (2010)). Another concern is that the banking sector will require significant additional funding, along with potential losses from the impaired assets held by NAMA. Indeed, some commentators argue that Ireland may face a stark choice between restructuring the liabilities of unsecured creditors of financial institutions or defaulting on sovereign debt (Gurdgiev (2010) , Buiter (2010) ). Whilst a number of authors have noted that Ireland managed a remarkable turnaround in fiscal fortunes in the 1980s (BIS (2010a)), and that this was attributable to fiscal restraint, national and international circumstances are very different this time around. Firstly, instruments of monetary policy, principally interest and exchange rates, are outside our control. Thus, options such as currency devaluation, which was implemented very successfully in 1986 and was instrumental in easing the subsequent debt crisis, are not available.
Secondly, attempts to minimise the costs of the banking crisis by restructuring liabilities is severely restrained by the insistence of our European partners that this may not be considered until after 2013.
An additional concern is that projected figures for recapitalisation of the banking sector are underestimated, and the additional amount required will place a further burden on an already precarious fiscal position. Thirdly, the fiscal adjustment required to address structural imbalances in the Irish economy is extremely large and will require additional expenditure cuts and tax increases, which will further hinder economic growth. Despite the implementation of significant fiscal consolidation measures of approximately 9% of GDP to date, the budget deficit is projected to amount to over 12% of GDP by the end of 2011.
Although the Irish government must act decisively to implement fiscal consolidation measures to address the structural imbalance in the economy, the implementation of policy at the European level is urgently required, particularly the enactment of a banking resolution mechanism for Eurozone countries. Recognising that Ireland is not unique in it's fiscal difficulties, European leaders must act quickly, as doubts remain as to the sustainability of the overall debt level for a number of EU peripheral countries Kouretas and Vlamis (2010) , with some authors highlighting the threat to the euro (Prokopijevi (2010) ). Fiscal policies which contributed to the crisis in the Irish economy have been, and will continue to be rectified by the government and borne by Irish citizens. Ultimately, the enormous fiscal cost of the banking crisis, comprising almost 40% of GDP, cannot be addressed unilaterally and will require coordinated European measures.
The Irish Banking Crisis
A major part of the deterioration of the fiscal balance sheet can be laid at the collapse of the credit bubble. This credit bubble ultimately also destroyed the Irish banking system, and the policy solutions adopted by the government had the consequence of inextricably mingling the balance sheets of the state and banking sectors. This intermingling in the end resulted in the need for Ireland to seek a bailout .The credit bubble in Ireland was long-lived, exceptionally large, and widespread. It was not confined to a bubble in lending to the housing and development sector, although that was its apex.
The credit fuelled property bubble led to a massive skewing of the Irish bank balance sheets, while the household credit bubble led to strains on the Irish household balance sheet.
The extent of the credit bubble is starkly illustrated in Figure 7 which shows the growth trajectories of private sector credit in aggregate and that of GNP are compared. The credit bubble is very evident. A number of features are important to note in this bubble. First, a very large acceleration is evidence after 2000, which coincides with the entry of Ireland to the EMU. It is very commonly suggested (see….) that Irish interest rates post EMU were lower than that which would be suggested by a Taylor rule. Thus, to some extent, this low interest rate regime, combined with the lax fiscal position noted earlier, coincided with and to some extent may have led the growth in private sector credit (see Kelly (2009) for a discussion of this and Fagan and Gaspar (2007) for a discussion of this lower credit cost across the euro zone) . Second, this growth in private sector credit was to a great extent funded not by growth in deposits but by a growth in external borrowing. Lane (2011) notes that the net external position of Irish banks deteriorated, rising from approx 20% GDP in 2003 to over 70% GDP at the peak of the boom in Q1 2008. This is also evident when we examine Table 1 where we see the aggregate balance sheet of credit institutions. There we see that from a position of being funded for the most part by domestic customer deposits in 1999 the banks had by end 2008 moved to being heavily dependent on bond financing and non-resident interbank deposits, with a worrying erosion of capital also evident. Third, this money, borrowed from abroad at cheap interest rates, was lent disproportionally to the housing and speculative development sector. Kelly (2009) and Figure 8 shows the average quarterly price of new houses and the average weekly earnings, demonstrating clearly the acceleration of house prices from the late 1990's and more especially the rising "unaffordability" of these houses. It is startling that throughout the most explosive part of the boom bank credit conditions were progressively looser and looser (see Honohan (2009) ). It is important to note that these prices hide considerable variation, with houses, especially in Dublin, rising faster than apartments and some regional areas at times showing rates of new home increases that were in excess of 10% q-q. The dramatic collapse in the prices of houses, signalled as to its immanency, extent and duration by Kelly (2007b) and the consequent losses on the by now heavily property driven Irish banks balance sheets, have wreaked havoc on both the banks and on individuals. It has also had a major effect on the landscape with "ghost estates" comprising semi finished housing developments littering the countryside (see Kitchin, Gleeson et al. (2010)) A feature of the Irish housing market is that upwards of 60% of mortgages were of the tracker type, and this had become the most popular form of a burgeoning mortgage product market (Doyle (and recall that the crash is by no means over) the number of persons in negative equity may be 200,000 of the 1.8m households in Ireland. As Ireland faces reduced employment prospects and the need for a more flexible labour market the well known retardation effects of such by the presence of negative equity (see Saiz (2004), Ferreira, Gyourko et al. (2008) , Hellebrandt, Kawar et al. (2009) ) makes this an important policy issue, which has only belatedly been given attention by the Irish government. A further effect of the crash was to increase the amount of distressed mortgages.
There is no non-recourse mortgage lending in Ireland, and the personal bankruptcy laws are generally seen to be too rigid (Gerhardt (2009) ). Combined with a cultural aversion to eviction, the ultimate end of distressed mortgages and this leaves a toxic brew of individuals unable to service mortgages and banks unable or unwilling to repossess and realise some liquidity or crystallise a loss. Gerhardt and however that while this may have precipitated a requirement for government intervention the eroding bank capital bases, flights of deposits, and general weakness (which had begin to be hinted at during q2 2008 by the banks) were consequences of lax regulation, poor fiscal policy and lack of board level supervision in the banks, which had allowed the bubbles to inflate as long as they did.
The collapse of Lehman's in mid September was followed by renewed credit freezes. The
Irish banks, Anglo Irish bank in particular, were at this stage heavily "borrowed short, lent long", funding themselves from a shrinking and expensive pool of interbank and bond financing and lent into a deflating illiquid property boom. Over the period 28-29 September 2008 it became clear that Anglo
Irish Bank in particular was in deep trouble, and would not be able to continue independently.
Extensive cabinet discussion resulted in the government, on 30 September, extending a blanket guarantee on not only all deposits but on all senior and indeed some junior debt of the 6 main banks.
Indeed, a guarantee was given not only on existing but on any future bonds to be issued. This was at the time and has subsequently been severely criticised. The main issue of contention was the decision to not impose any burden sharing, and to extend the guarantee to INBS/Anglo, widely seen as at that stage not systemic. Extensive discussions of the decision are contained in Honohan (2010a), Honohan (2009) , Kelly (2010) . Despite this extraordinarily wide guarantee, it became clear over the winter that further action was required, although for some considerable time the government was unwilling to accept that any recapitalisation was required ( see Lucey, Connor et al. (2008) , This took two forms.
First, Anglo Irish Bank was nationalised, in early 2009, and some limited recapitalization, in the form of preference shares, was placed into the two larger banks, Allied Irish and Bank of Ireland. Second, the government proceeded with the setting up of a "bad bank", the National Asset Management Agency -NAMA. The essence of the approach was to strip from guaranteed banks the entirety of their development and land loans (this was subsequently and serially modified as NAMA found itself unable to move swiftly) at a discount and to pay for these with government bonds issued by NAMA.
To date NAMA has issued €31b debt and taken €70b of loans off the books of the banks, and is scheduled to take a minimum of a further €16b. Although designed as a private company, with a "golden share" to ensure state control, these debts are clearly and are seen as being state debts. The consequence of the embedded losses in the banks and the crystallised losses from asset fire sales and agree to open discussions with the EFSF, the IMF and with smaller bilateral deals being made with the UK and with Denmark (both of whom had financial institutions with significant operations in Ireland) a package was agreed with the consequences noted above.
After the crisis
As noted, on 25 Feb the government, which had been in power from 1997 to 2011, and which therefore grew and blew the booms, was voted out of office. Throughout the election the outgoing governments response to the crises dominated the campaign, Chaffin, Brown et al. (2011) , with the terms of the bailout front and centre. Despite the change in government however the room for manoeuvre of the incoming government was and will remain limited. A major divide exists between advocates of increased burden sharing including haircuts on senior bank debt and those that do not so advocate. The main thrust of those that urged burden sharing (see for example Eichengreen (2010) ) was that to not do so would result in a burden on the Irish taxpayer that could in the end result in a default situation on sovereign debt. The avowed policy of the incoming government (Kirby (2011)) was to seek renegotiation of the November 2010 bailout, in particular the interest rate charged and the time period for repayment.. It is clear, from both the Irish and the Greek crises, that the institutions of the Euro zone require significant work to allow for some degree of flexibility. Greater flexibility in relation to burden sharing is also required (see Gros (2010) ). Whether these will happen, and we will see the creation for example of "trichet" bonds, similar to the Brady bonds (Economides and Smith (2011) ). An alternative is that we will instead see the scenario envisaged in Buiter (2010) , and not all are hopeful that the crisis will be resolved (Anonymous (2011)) . But it is clear that one lesson must be learned: membership of a currency union operating without a concomitant fiscal union commits a country to self-imposed discipline. Lacking that, a severe adjustment will be required if a crisis emerges. 1975Q1 1976Q1 1977Q1 1978Q1 1979Q1 1980Q1 1981Q1 1982Q1 1983Q1 1984Q1 1985Q1 1986Q1 1987Q1 1988Q1 1989Q1 1990Q1 1991Q1 1992Q1 1993Q1 1994Q1 1995Q1 1996Q1 1997Q1 1998Q1 1999Q1 
